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INTEREST AND IDENTITY 
OF AMICUS CURIAE1 
 Counsel is a law professor at the University 
of New Hampshire School of Law and a member of 
the U.S. Supreme Court bar. He has spent the last 
twenty years focused on policy and law development 
in the area of genetic privacy, through litigation, 
scholarship and teaching. He has lectured, taught 
and written in the area of genetic privacy, partic-
ularly with regard to the Fourth Amendment. That 
background gives him a deep interest in a thoughtful 
resolution of the petition. 
 Professor Scherr received a two-year NIH ELSI 
(Ethical, Legal and Social Implications) grant to 
study the Constitution and genetic privacy, one result 
of which was a 2013 article: Albert E. Scherr, Genetic 
Privacy & The Fourth Amendment: Unregulated Sur-
reptitious DNA Harvesting, 47 Ga. L. Rev. 445 (2013), 
the very subject of the above-captioned petition.  
 He was also the co-founder and co-investigator 
with a moral philosopher and geneticist on a sequence 
of three three-year NIH ELSI grants at Dartmouth Col-
lege to train domestic and international undergraduate 
 
 1 The parties were notified ten days prior to the due date of 
this brief of the intention to file. The parties have consented to 
the filing of this brief. No counsel for a party authored this brief 
in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a monetary 
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of 
this brief. No person other than amicus curiae made a monetary 
contribution to its preparation or submission. 
2 
faculty on the substance and technique of teaching 
ELSI issues at the graduate and undergraduate lev-
els. He continues to lecture at undergraduate institu-
tions around the country on genetic privacy issues. 
He has also taught the foundational course in Crimi-
nal Procedure for many years at the University of 
New Hampshire School of Law. 
 Professor Scherr also litigated a number of fo-
rensic DNA admissibility issues in state and federal 
courts. See, e.g., State v. Vandebogart, 139 N.H. 145, 
652 A.2d 671 (1995); United States v. Shea, 957 
F. Supp. 331 (D. N.H. 1997), affirmed, 211 F.3d 658 
(1st Cir. 2000). He was on the board of the national 
ACLU for six years and during that time chaired its 
Patents & Civil Liberties Committee.  
 By virtue of his litigation, scholarship and policy 
work, Professor Scherr is uniquely situated to offer a 
rich and well-developed perspective on the issues 
raised in petitioner’s case. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
INTRODUCTION AND 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Professor Scherr agrees with petitioner that re-
view is warranted because the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals decision is erroneous. The Fourth Amendment 
does not sanction police harvesting of DNA without 
probable cause and a warrant and without the sub-
ject’s knowledge or consent, to be used however the 
authorities deem appropriate and without restriction. 
3 
The Maryland Court of Appeals’ decision is contrary 
to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence as articulated 
in the Riley v. California – Maryland v. King – United 
States v. Jones trilogy. This case fits squarely in the 
center of the triangle formed by that trilogy. The 
petition should be accepted to remedy this conflict at 
the intersection of this Court’s jurisprudence on the 
newest forensic technology and the Fourth Amend-
ment. 
 Professor Scherr also agrees with the petitioner 
that this Court should accept this petition to resolve 
a conflict between a Federal Court of Appeals and 
a state court of appeals. In United States v. Davis, 
690 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2012), the Fourth Circuit 
found that the police implicated the suspect’s Fourth 
Amendment privacy interest when it sought to obtain 
a DNA profile from his blood found on clothing it held 
legally. In this case the Maryland Court of Appeals 
found the opposite. As surreptitious harvesting cases 
continue to enter the criminal justice system, it is an 
opportune time for this Court to resolve this conflict 
and offer guidance to state and federal courts. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
   
4 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Maryland Court Of Appeals’ Rule Is 
Contrary To This Court’s Fourth Amend-
ment Jurisprudence As Articulated In The 
Riley-King-Jones Trilogy 
 This Court’s recent jurisprudence in cases involv-
ing new and sophisticated technology elucidates a set 
of Fourth Amendment principles as to information 
that (A) has varying degrees of accessibility within an 
item; (B) is publicly available in some fashion; or (C) 
involves the potential for either controlled or uncon-
trolled data collection. The Maryland Court of Ap-
peals decision in petitioner’s case conflicts with that 
jurisprudence. 
 
A. Riley v. California and Information Ac-
cessibility 
 In Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), this 
Court found that, though the police had possession 
of an individual’s cellphone legally under the search-
incident-to-arrest doctrine, a search of the contents of 
that cellphone constituted an additional search which 
required either a warrant supported by probable 
cause or by a warrant exception to justify it constitu-
tionally.  
 In petitioner’s case, petitioner’s sweat replaces 
the Riley cellphone and petitioner’s DNA replaces the 
contents of the cellphone. Otherwise, the circum-
stance is identical. Contrary to the Maryland Court 
of Appeals’ holding that the DNA testing of the 13 
5 
identifying “junk” loci within one’s genetic material, 
not obtained by means of a physical intrusion into the 
person’s body, does not constitute a Fourth Amend-
ment search, Raynor v. Maryland, 99 A.3d 753, 767 
(Md. 2014), a search of the contents of one’s sweat for 
DNA constitutes a search worthy of Fourth Amend-
ment protection. 
 In Riley, this Court identified (1) the “immense 
storage capacity” of a cellphone, id. at 2489; (2) the 
collection in one place of “many distinct types of in-
formation – an address, a note, a prescription, a bank 
statement, a video – that reveal much more in combi-
nation than any isolated record,” id.; (3) that “the 
data on a phone can date back to the purchase of the 
phone, or even earlier,” id.; (4) the “element of perva-
siveness that characterizes cellphones,” id. at 2490; 
and the “qualitatively different” nature of cellphone 
data, id., among the several factors that dis-
tinguished cellphone contents from other physical 
records. 
 The storage capacity of biological material for 
DNA is immense. Every cell has DNA and it contains 
all of an individual’s DNA, not just the DNA of that 
“body part.” In that DNA exists information that is 
intimate, personal, shared, predictive and powerful. 
Scherr, supra, at 493-504. It contains a kaleidoscope 
of one’s identity that interacts passively and actively 
with the environment. And, it is not easily accessible; 
taken as a whole, it is unique; it is permanent and it 
exists at the core of one’s physical being. Id. at 501.  
6 
 To paraphrase this Court’s language in Riley: 
DNA is not just another technological convenience. 
With all it contains and all it may reveal, it holds for 
many Americans “the privacies of life.” The fact that 
technology now allows an individual to access such 
information does not make the information any less 
worthy of the protection for which the Founders 
fought. Our answer to the question of what police 
must do before searching for DNA in biological mate-
rial seized legally is accordingly simple – get a war-
rant. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494-95. 
 
B. United States v. Jones and Publicly Avail-
able Information 
 In Jones, this Court concluded that the at-
tachment of a Global Positioning System (GPS) track-
ing device to a vehicle, and subsequent use of that 
device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public 
streets, was a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. Though the Court split on the justifica-
tion for this conclusion, the result for the entire Court 
was premised on the principle that obtaining publicly 
available information – the suspect’s whereabouts 
while in public – may constitute a search in spite of 
its public nature.  
 Members of the Court took differing approaches 
to the public surveillance question. Justice Sotomayor 
and Justice Alito (joined by Justices Kagan, Kennedy 
and Breyer) in separate opinions expressed the view 
that “longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of 
most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy” 
7 
while short-term monitoring did not. 132 S. Ct. at 955 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., con-
curring). Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Roberts 
and Thomas, expressed the view that the public sur-
veillance of the suspect combined with the tres-
passory intrusion on the suspect’s jeep constituted 
a search. Id. at 954. He postponed the “vexing ques-
tion” of what extent such monitoring merited Fourth 
Amendment protection. 
 Even in light of the differing approaches, Jones 
effectively holds that the existence in public of that 
which is being searched does not disqualify it from 
Fourth Amendment protection. This is a notable ad-
dition of nuance to the Court’s perspective in the 
iconic Fourth Amendment search case, Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) where the Court said: “For 
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. 
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even 
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection.” Id. at 352.  
 By contrast, the Maryland Court of Appeals 
found that “ . . . [p]etitioner exposed to the public, 
albeit not to the naked eye, the identifying content of 
the genetic material he left on the armrests of the 
chair.” Raynor, 99 A.3d at 94. This conclusion is in 
direct conflict with Jones (measurement of publicly 
available and very accessible “whereabouts”) and 
with Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (meas-
urement of publicly available, but less accessible 
“heat”) where the police conduct constituted a search 
for Fourth Amendment purposes. By that standard, 
8 
the measurement of publicly available, though very 
much inaccessible, DNA in petitioner’s case consti-
tutes a constitutionally protected search.  
 
C. Maryland v. King and Controlled/ 
Uncontrolled Data Collection 
 In Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013), this 
Court directly confronted a DNA search case for the 
first time. It concluded that the police may acquire 
biological material via a buccal swab from one ar-
rested for a crime in certain circumstances. The 
acquisition of the biological material and the mining 
for DNA constituted a search for Fourth Amendment 
purposes and was reasonable under the circum-
stances of that case.  
 Those circumstances included a state statutory 
structure that regulated the DNA collection and use 
closely. The DNA could only be used for identification 
purposes and the analysis only looked at 13 standard 
STR loci. Familial and other types of searches were 
explicitly prohibited and the collection was part of the 
highly regulated CODIS system.  
 In particular, this Court in King noted with 
approval its statements in prior cases as to how a 
statutory or regulatory scheme can allay privacy con-
cerns related to data collection and chose not to spec-
ulate about its conclusions if such a scheme did not 
exist. It then described the next sequence of cases: 
9 
If in the future police analyze samples to de-
termine, for instance, an arrestee’s predis-
position for a particular disease or other 
hereditary factors not relevant to identity, 
that case would present additional privacy 
concerns not present here. 
Id. at 1979. 
 Petitioner’s case is the first in that next se-
quence. Here, the police used the DNA to identify the 
petitioner as a possible contributor of the crime scene 
sample, a kind of identification purpose. But, unlike 
in King, no regulatory or statutory structure limited 
their use of petitioner’s DNA. Like in Kyllo, the po-
tential knowledge available from the DNA was broad 
and intrusive. In King, the search was limited to 
identifying information by a strict statutory scheme. 
In Kyllo, though the government contended that the 
search was constitutional because it was only search-
ing for evidence of high-intensity lamps, 533 U.S. at 
38, the Court expressed concern for the potential of 
the search to reveal intimate details of one’s personal 
life within a protected space. Id. at 38-39.  
 Further, unlike in King, where significant prohi-
bitions existed on the storage and future use of the 
DNA, no prohibitions exist on the use of the DNA in 
this case or in future such cases. In fact, the city of 
Baltimore, Maryland has a database with the DNA of 
more than 3,000 homicide victims in it. Other local 
and county law enforcement authorities have also 
collected a variety of individuals’ DNA in databases. 
  
10 
“Police Agencies Are Assembling Records of DNA,” 
The New York Times, June 12, 2013. And, this prac-
tice is not new. Scherr, supra, at 447.  
 It is particularly noteworthy that the petitioner 
expressed that very concern to the police when they 
asked him for a sample of his DNA. Certiorari Peti-
tion of Petitioner at 3. Yet, without his knowledge and 
with his explicit refusal to consent, the police col-
lected and searched his biological sample. No evi-
dence exists in this case or other such cases as to the 
fate of the biological samples from the petitioner 
or others whose samples have been collected and 
searched.  
 The Maryland Court of Appeals concluded “[t]hat 
Petitioner’s DNA could have disclosed more intimate 
information is of no moment in the present case 
because there is no allegation that the police tested 
his DNA sample for that purpose.” Raynor, 99 A.3d at 
768. That conclusion conflicts with this Court’s ap-
proach to the Fourth Amendment and data collection 
in King – controlled data collection and in Kyllo – the 
potential for uncontrolled data collection. See also, 
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (strict statutory 
data protections obviate need for constitutional pri-
vacy analysis). 
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II. The Maryland Court Of Appeals And The 
United States Court Of Appeals For The 
Fourth Circuit Decisions In Unregulated 
Surreptitious DNA Harvesting Cases Con-
flict And That Conflict Merits Resolution 
By This Court 
 In 2012, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
found that the extraction of Mr. Davis’s DNA from 
clothing and the creation of a genetic profile consti-
tuted a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. In 
2014, the Maryland Court of Appeals found that the 
extraction of Mr. Raynor’s DNA from his sweat and 
the creation of a genetic profile did not constitute a 
search for Fourth Amendment purposes. The Davis 
and Raynor holdings represent an irreconcilable di-
vision between a federal appellate court and a state 
court of last resort. This Court should accept this 
petition to resolve this division in the interests of the 
administration of justice. 
 The practice of surreptitious DNA harvesting is 
not new. It has been occurring at the least since the 
early 2000’s. Scherr, supra, at 454-56. Almost without 
exception, courts have been deciding the issue using 
an abandonment theory (a question not at issue 
in this case), finding that no Fourth Amendment-
protected search occurred., Id. at 454-59 though the 
use of that theory has been questioned. Id. at 465-68.  
 But, other than Raynor, the large majority of 
these cases preceded the Riley-King-Jones trilogy 
which together bring a fresh perspective to the prac-
tice as noted above. Id. at 454-59. A resolution of the 
12 
Davis/Raynor conflict would bring much needed 
definition to a developing area.  
 In addition, the practice of surreptitious harvest-
ing is one of a number of practices that appear to be 
resulting in the development of the rogue DNA data-
bases noted above. Other techniques have included 
acquiring and uploading DNA taken for the limited 
purpose of eliminating the donor as a suspect into a 
DNA database. Such databases of DNA samples – 
both biological and numerical – are not part of federal 
or state CODIS-regulated databases. They are com-
pletely unregulated and allow for whatever use law 
enforcement desires. See, e.g., Stephen Mercer & 
Jessica Gabel, Shadow Dwellers: The Underregulated 
World of State and Local DNA Databases, 69 N.Y.U. 
Ann. Surv. Am. L. 639 (forthcoming 2014).  
 Because surreptitious DNA harvesting occurs 
without probable cause or a warrant, no regulatory, 
statutory or constitutional check exists on such sam-
ples entering these unregulated databases. Accep-
tance of this petition provides the Court with an 
opportunity to evaluate one of the practices leading to 
constitutionally suspect rogue databases now growing 
around the country. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
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CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant 
the petition for a writ of certiorari.  
Respectfully submitted, 
ALBERT E. SCHERR, ESQ. 
Counsel of Record 
Professor of Law 
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 SCHOOL OF LAW 
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Albert.scherr@law.unh.edu 
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